

Message Text

SECRET

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FM USDEL SECRETARY IN GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 8019

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E.O.11652:GDS
TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)
SUBJECT: VANCE-GROMYKO MEETING MORNING SESSION JULY 12

SECRETARY VANCE MADE A FORMAL PRESENTATION ON SALT AT
THE OPENING SESSION, THE TEXT OF WHICH FOLLOWS BELOW.
GROMYKO ASKED FOR A RECESS UNTIL 3:30 THIS AFTERNOON
TO CONSIDER THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL. WE WILL MEET WITH
THE SOVIET DELEGATION AGAIN AT THAT TIME. QUOTE

THIS MORNING I PROPOSE THAT WE FOCUS ON ONE OF THE
MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED IN THE
AGREEMENT : LIMITATIONS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW TYPES
OF STRATEGIC MISSILES AND ON MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING
TYPES OF STRATEGIC MISSILES.

I WOULD FIRST LIKE TO REVIEW WHERE WE STAND ON THE
ISSUES OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS AND OF MODERNIZA-
TION OF EXISTING TYPES.

IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED A BAN ON
TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS IN THE
PROTOCOL. THIS WOULD PROHIBIT INTRODUCTION OF NEW TYPES
OF ICBMS THROUGH 1980 WHILE WE DISCUSS HOW TO DEAL WITH
THIS ISSUE IN SALT III.

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WE HAVE ALSO INDICATED THAT WE COULD ACCEPT A BAN ON
TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS THROUGH
1985, EXCEPT THAT EITHER SIDE COULD TEST AND DEPLOY ONE
NEW ICBM, MIRVED, OR NON-MIRVED. THIS WOULD PERMIT YOU
TO GO AHEAD WITH THE NEW, SINGLE RV ICBM, WHICH FITS
YOUR FORCE STRUCTURE, AND WOULD PERMIT US TO PROCEED WITH

A NEW MIRVED ICBM, WHICH WOULD FIT INTO OUR FORCE STRUCTURE. THIS WOULD PROVIDE FOR EQUALITY AND EQUAL SECURITY ON BOTH SIDES.

EITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS WOULD REPRESENT A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE ICBM NEW TYPES ISSUE.

IN THE CONTEXT OF A PROTOCOL BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS, WE COULD AGREE TO A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF SLBMS, ALLOWING FOR CONTINUED TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF TRIDENT I AND FOR THE SS-N-18.

IN THE CONTEXT OF A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS THROUGH 1985 WITH ONE EXEMPTION, MIRVED OR NON-MIRVED, FOR EACH SIDE, WE COULD AGREE TO A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF SLBMS FOR THE SAME PERIOD, WITH ONE EXEMPTION. IN OUR CASE THIS WOULD BE THE TRIDENT II, AND IN YOUR CASE THIS WOULD BE THE TYPHOON (RSM-52). UNDER THIS PROPOSAL, TRIDENT I AND THE SS-N-18 WOULD BE CONSIDERED EXISTING TYPES.

YOU HAVE PROPOSED A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS FOR THE PROTOCOL PERIOD, EXCEPT THAT EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO TEST AND DEPLOY ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE. THIS PROPOSAL WOULD PREVENT US FROM TESTING ANY NEW MISSILE, WHILE ALLOWING YOU TO GO AHEAD WITH A NEW SINGLE RV ICBM FOR WHICH WE HAVE NO PROGRAM AND NO NEED. THIS IS INEQUITABLE AND UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

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YOU HAVE ALSO PROPOSED A BAN ON NEW TYPES THROUGH 1985, WITH THE SAME EXEMPTION FOR A NEW SINGLE RV ICBM. THIS IS EVEN MORE ONE-SIDED:

--THE U.S. WOULD HAVE NO NEW ICBM FOR THE DURATION OF THE 1985 AGREEMENT, SINCE WE HAVE NO PROGRAM OR REQUIREMENT FOR A NEW SINGLE RV ICBM.

--THE SOVIET UNION WOULD, HOWEVER, BE ABLE TO DEPLOY ITS ENTIRELY NEW TYPE OF SINGLE RV. ICBM.

FINALLY, YOU HAVE PROPOSED A BAN ON THE TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS THROUGH 1985, WITHOUT EXCEPTION. THIS PROPOSAL INDICATES THAT YOU CAN FOREGO A NEW SINGLE RV ICBM. IN THAT SENSE, IT REPRESENTS A CONSTRUCTIVE STEP TO WHICH WE HAVE GIVEN CONSIDERATION IN OUR OWN THINKING. THE LOGIC OF THIS PROPOSAL ARGUES THAT YOU SHOULD BE ABLE TO ACCEPT OUR PROPOSAL FOR A PROTOCOL BAN ON ALL NEW TYPES, WHICH WOULD IMPOSE EQUAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES.

AS FOR SLBM NEW TYPES, YOUR PROPOSAL IS THE SAME FOR ALL VARIANTS: A BAN ON FLIGHT TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT FOR EITHER THE PROTOCOL OR THE 1985 PERIOD, WITH AN EXCEPTION FOR TRIDENT I AND THE TYPHOON. THIS IS NOT EQUITABLE. TRIDENT I HAS ALREADY BEGUN FLIGHT-TESTING AND SHOULD BE TREATED THE SAME AS SS-N-18. SOVIET RIGHTS TO A NEW,

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UNTESTED SLBM MUST BE BALANCED BY EQUAL RIGHTS FOR THE US. THIS MEANS THAT TRIDENT II AND TYPHOON MUST BE TREATED COMPARABLY. EITHER THEY MUST BOTH BE BANNED OR BOTH BE EXEMPTED.

THERE IS ALSO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO DEFINE A NEW TYPE OF ICBM, WHICH IS BEING ADDRESSED BY THE DELEGATIONS. THE US HAS MADE A MAJOR MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE SOVIET SIDE, SO WE ARE CLOSER TO AGREEMENT ON THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES REMAIN.

I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF A PROHIBITION ON AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES ON EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS AND SLBMS. THE US SIDE NOTES THE SOVIET INCLUSION IN ITS MAY 1978 PROPOSAL OF THE RULE THAT IN THE COURSE OF MODERNIZATION OF AN EXISTING TYPE, THE NUMBER OF RVS ON THAT TYPE SHOULD NOT BE INCREASED. WE WELCOME THIS INDICATION THAT YOU AGREE THAT FRACTIONATION LIMITS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES ARE A VALUABLE PART OF DEALING MEANINGFULLY WITH THE NEW TYPES ISSUE.

IN THIS CONNECTION, WE BELIEVE EACH SIDE SHOULD SPECIFY HOW MANY RVS HAVE BEEN TESTED ON EXISTING TYPES.

THE US ALSO REGARDS AS IMPORTANT THE ELEMENTS OF OUR
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DEFINITION OF NEW TYPES ABOUT RESTRICTING CHANGES IN
INDIVIDUAL STAGES AND IN THE RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS
OF WHAT WE CALL THE POST-BOOST VEHICLE FOR CURRENT
MISSILES.

WE ALSO BELIEVE THAT AN EXEMPTED NEW TYPE OF ICBM
SHOULD NOT HAVE MORE THAN 10 REENTRY VEHICLES, WHICH IS
THE MAXIMUM NUMBER TESTED TO DATE ON AN ICBM ON EITHER
SIDE. SIMILARLY, IF WE AGREE TO EXEMPT A NEW TYPE OF SLBM,
THERE SHOULD BE A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES
AT 14, THE MAXIMUM NUMBER TESTED BY EITHER SIDE TO DATE
ON AN SLBM.

IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF REENTRY
VEHICLES ON EXEMPTED MISSILES. THIS PROVISION, ALONG
WITH THE BAN ON INCREASING THE NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES
ON EXISTING BALLISTIC MISSILES, WOULD MAKE A SIGNIFICANT
CONTRIBUTION TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A NEW TYPES BAN AND
TO THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

WE HAVE EXPLAINED THE RATIONALE FOR THE TWO ALTERNA-
TIVES FOR A BAN ON NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WE HAVE OFFERED, AND I
I CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT EITHER WOULD LEAD TO AN EQUITABLE
SOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

AS I SAID AT THE BEGINNING, THE NEW TYPES ISSUE IS
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT POLITICAL-LEVEL ISSUES REMAINING
TO BE RESOLVED IN THE AGREEMENT. IF WE ARE ABLE TO REACH
A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION, I BELIEVE WE WILL HAVE MADE
A GREAT STRIDE TOWARD A FINAL AGREEMENT.

IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE FOR THE
PROGRESS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS, AND IN LIGHT OF THOSE
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CONSTRUCTIVE ELEMENTS OF THE SOVIET MAY 1978 PROPOSALS,
AND IN AN EFFORT TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN YOUR PROPOSALS
AND OURS, I AM PREPARED TO OFFER THE FOLLOWING COMPROMISE.

I WANT TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN OUR VIEW THE NEW TYPES
ISSUE HAS SEVERAL RELATED ELEMENTS WHICH APPLY TO BOTH
ICBMS AND SLBMS: A BAN ON NEW TYPES, A DEFINITION OF
PERMITTED MODERNIZATION OF EXISTING TYPES WHICH PREVENTS

INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF RVS ON AN EXISTING TYPE;
AND POSSIBLE EXEMPTIONS FOR NEW TYPES. OUR NEW PROPOSAL
HAS BEEN DESIGNED TO RESOLVE ALL THESE ELEMENTS AS A
WHOLE. IT FORMS AN INTEGRATED PACKAGE AND CANNOT BE BROKEN
INTO INDIVIDUAL PARTS.

WE ARE PREPARED TO PROHIBIT TESTING AND DEPLOYMENT
OF ANY NEW TYPES OF ICBMS THROUGH 1985, EXCEPT THAT
EACH SIDE WOULD BE PERMITTED TO FLIGHT-TEST ONE NEW
TYPE OF ICBM, MIRVED OR NON-MIRVED. HOWEVER, DEPLOYMENT
OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WOULD BE PROHIBITED THROUGH 1985.

--NEW TYPES OF ICBMS WOULD BE DETERMINED BY
THE DEFINITION WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED, INCLUDING
A BAN ON AN INCREASE IN THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF REENTRY
VEHICLES ON ANY EXISTING TYPE OF MISSILE. THE EXEMPTED
ICBM COULD HAVE NO MORE THAN 10 REENTRY VEHICLES.

--THIS PROPOSAL, WHEN CONSIDERED IN RELATION TO THE
820 LIMIT ON MIRVED ICBMS, REPRESENTS A MEANINGFUL
ARMS CONTROL STEP. YET IT GIVES BOTH SIDES
FLEXIBILITY IN DECIDING HOW TO STRUCTURE ITS MIX

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OF MIRVED AND SINGLE WARHEAD ICBMS.
WE ARE ALSO PREPARED TO AGREE TO A BAN ON NEW TYOES
OF SLBMS THROUGH 1985, EXCEPT THAT ONE NEW TYPE OF SLBM
COULD BE TESTED AND DEPLOYED' THE SLBM EXEMPTION WOULD
APPLY TO TYTTPHOON ON YOUR SIDE AND TRIDENT II ON OUR SIDE.
THE TRIDENT I AND THE SS-N-18 WOULD BE CONSIDERED EXISTING
SLBMS.

THERE WOULD BE A PROHIBITION ON INCREASES IN THE NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES FOR EXISTING TYPES OF SLBMS. THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF REENTRY VEHICLES ON AN EXEMPTED SLBM WOULD BE 14.

THIS PROPOSAL TAKES INTO ACCOUNT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE APPROACHES TAKEN BY BOTH SIDES; YOU WANTED TO BAN NEW ICBMS THROUGH 1985, AND THEY COULD BE BANNED. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO OBTAIN EQUALITY OF CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES. IT IS GOOD ARMS CONTROL AND IT GIVES EACH SIDE FLEXIBILITY TO STRUCTURE ITS OWN FORCES.

IN MAKING THIS PROPOSAL, I WANT ALSO TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE US CANNOT ACCEPT A LIMIT ON THE NUMBER OF ALCMS CARRIED BY AN AIRCRAFT LIMITED UNDER THE 1320 CEILING, AND THIS NEW PROPOSAL IS CONTINGENT ON YOUR AGREEMENT THAT THERE BE NO SUCH LIMITS.

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AS I SAID, THIS NEW PROPOSAL IS OFFERED AS AN INTEGRATED PACKAGE AND CANNOT BE BROKEN INTO INDIVIDUAL PARTS. WE OFFER IT IN AN EFFORT TO SEEK A FAIR AND A PROMPT RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE.

I WANT TO MAKE TWO POINTS IN CONCLUSION.

THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD NO NEW ICBMS SINCE THE MM III, FIRST DEPLOYED ALMOST A DECADE AGO. THE SOVIET UNION HAS DEPLOYED SEVERAL ICBMS IN THAT PERIOD, MOST OF THEM MIRVED AND FAR LARGER THAN THE MM III.

I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT BY MAKING THIS PROPOSAL THE US HAS MADE A SERIOUS AND SUBSTANTIAL POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO CONCLUDE A NEW AGREEMENT. UNQUOTE VANCE

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